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Abstract   
Multinational enterprise  performance is  one  of the most researched topics in the strategic 
management  literature  over  the  last  thirty  years.  Despite  the  proliferation  of  studies,  the 
dispute  over  the  relation  between  firms’  international  investment  activities  and  corporate 
performance has not yet reached a consensus. This paper’s contribution is threefold. First, we 
focus on entry by West European multinational enterprises into Central and East European 
countries. Second, we develop a multi-theory argument, combining insights from transaction 
cost, new institutional, behavioral, resource-based and international strategy theories. Third, 
we  estimate  the  determinants  of  managerial  satisfaction  with  subsidiary  performance  with 
questionnaire data for a sample of 198 subsidiaries.   2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Multinational enterprise (MNE) performance is one of the most researched topics in the 
strategic management literature over the last thirty years (Miller, 2004). The relation 
between multinationality and performance has not only “generated a flurry of empirical 
studies” (Kotabe et al., 2002), but has also produced inconsistent findings. Over thirty 
studies  have  tackled  a  range  of  linear  (positive  or  negative),  curvilinear  U-shaped, 
inverted U-shaped and S-shaped relations between the degree of firms’ multinationality 
and their performance (recent examples are Kotabe et al. 2002; Goerzen and Beamish, 
2003; Capar and Kotabe, 2003; Lu and Beamish, 2004). Despite the proliferation of 
studies, the dispute over the relation between firms’ international investment activities 
and  corporate  performance  has  not  yet  reached  a  consensus.  It  could  be  that  other 
factors, in addition to firms’ degree of multinationality, dominantly influence firms’ 
performance. Following standard strategic management logic, there are two prominent 
groups  of  such  factors  that  received  some,  albeit  insufficient,  attention  in  the  past: 
firms’ environmental contingencies and their organizational capabilities.  
Moreover, with a few exceptions, most studies on MNEs’ performance addressed 
the concept of geographic scope as a unidimensional construct, and did not account for 
host-countries’ environmental diversity (Goerzen and Beamish, 2003). We argue that 
because local environmental specificities are not similar, various geographic locations 
may have divergent effects on MNEs’ performance. Hence, the consideration of host-
country characteristics is of critical importance in studies on foreign direct investment 
and  MNEs’  performance.  In  addition,  we  believe  that  performance  is  largely 
conditional upon the firms’ competitive capabilities. Past studies on multinationality-
performance relations have at best controlled for firm-specific variables (Kotabe et al., 
2002),  thus  leaving  the  importance  of  firms’  assets  and  capabilities,  required  to 
effectively maximize the advantages of internationalization, largely under-researched. 
In conclusion, despite the fact that there has been an abundance of studies on MNEs’ 
performance,  more  research  is  necessary  to  illuminate  the  extent  to  which  firms 
endowed  with  specific  capabilities  to  establish  subsidiaries  in  diverse  environments 
benefit from their international activities (Wan and Hoskisson, 2003).    3 
This study makes the following threefold contribution to the extant literature. First, 
unlike the majority of studies on MNEs’ performance, which mostly examined either 
international expansion into developed countries or into a single emerging economy 
(particularly China), we investigate the level of satisfaction of West European business-
unit  managers  with  the  performance  of  their  subsidiaries  in  eight  Central  and  East 
European  (CEE)  transition  countries.
1  Second,  in  a  review  of  strategy  research  on 
emerging  economies,  Wright  et  al.  (2005)  identify  four  conceptual  perspectives  – 
transaction  cost  theory,  principal-agency  theory,  resource-based  theory  and  new 
institutional theory. In a similar vein, we argue that a single-theory approach in studies 
on  transition  will  limit  our  comprehension  of  the  magnitude  with  which  diverse 
endogenous  and  exogenous  factors  influence  MNEs’  performance.  In  this  study, 
therefore, we  combine elements of new institutional theory, transaction cost theory, 
behavioral  theory  of  the  firm,  resource-based  view  and  international  management 
theory to analyze how a set of exogenous host-country characteristics – i.e., transition 
economies’ institutional structure and national culture
2 – and a set of endogenous firm-
level heterogeneities, namely MNEs’ capabilities (intangible assets and strategies) and 
ownership stake, may influence managerial satisfaction with subsidiary performance.   
Third, to determine drivers of MNEs’ performance, earlier work has typically used 
information from corporate-level financial reports, such as annual return on sales and 
return on assets. In this study, we focus on a different level of analysis: we examine the 
performance  of  MNEs’  subsidiaries,  which  represent  business-unit  international 
expansion activities. Furthermore, due to the inaptness of officially published corporate 
performance  estimates,  unavailable  business-unit-level  information  or  incomparable 
annual reports for all subsidiaries, we conducted an international survey to capture the 
managers’ level of satisfaction with the performance of their subsidiaries. In fact, as far 
as  subsidiaries’  survival  is  concerned,  we  believe  that  headquarters’  subjective 
evaluation of subsidiary performance is of critical importance: Geringer and Herbert 
(1991) report that in the case of international joint ventures particularly those perceived 
by the parents as successfully performing were more likely to remain in operation.  
            4 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
A multi-theory approach 
Entries of MNEs from developed economies into emerging countries
3 have created an 
ever-rising “appetite for knowledge” about these markets (Meyer, 2004; Ramamurti, 
2004).  Transaction  cost  theory  (TCT)  and  its  offspring,  internalization  theory,  are 
considered  to  be  the  dominant  theoretical  perspectives  in  foreign  direct  investment 
studies (Dunning, 1993). Although emerging economies provide “a new ground to test 
and refine TCT”, its popularity measured by the number of articles applying the theory 
is rather limited in comparison to other perspectives such as the resource-based view of 
the  firm  (Wright  et  al.,  2005:  4).  TCT’s  key  constructs  such  as  transaction  costs, 
opportunism and uncertainty are, beyond doubt, highly relevant in transition economies, 
though: the arguments presented by Hoskisson et al. (2000) that transaction costs are 
higher in emerging economies than in developed countries are difficult to dispute.  
The  reason  for  TCT’s  unpopularity  among  transition  economies  researchers  is 
perhaps  the  fact  that,  given  the  hundreds  of  TCT  studies  already  published  in  the 
literature,  it  is  difficult  to  make  a  “solid  contribution”  based  on  an  exclusive  TCT 
perspective (Wright et al., 2005: 4). In a strive for theoretical contribution, yet retaining 
the benefits of TCT’s robust analytical tools, some authors have extended the theory 
with insights from new institutionalism to better fit with the specificities of transition 
economies.  On  such  premises,  it  is  argued  that  institutional  differences  between 
developed and transition economies exacerbate transaction costs (Meyer, 2001). Yet, 
there are avenues for cross-bridging TCT or resource-based logic with other theoretical 
domains that remain largely unexplored. We argue that that the entry mode choice and 
performance  are  conditional  upon  a  parent’s  strategic  posture  thus  the  key  role  of 
MNEs’ intangible resources can be further emphasized with insights from international 
management’s theory of international strategy.  
This type of argument suggests a multi-theory approach. We will explore such an 
eclectic perspective in this paper, too, focusing on a specific issue: the explanation of 
differences in the managerial satisfaction with subsidiary performance. If for managers 
from developed economies the process of establishing a successfully operating outlet in 
a transition economy narrows down to one leading challenge, namely “How to make   5 
their strategy work” (Wright et al., 2005: 7), then investigating the level of satisfaction 
with subsidiaries’ performance will give a clear indication of their success or failure in 
the  implementation  of  “western”  strategies.  In  this  line  of  argument,  we  further 
demonstrate  how  the  differences  between  the  context  of  business  activity  (CEE 
transition economies) and the setting of subsidiary evaluation (west European MNEs) 
shape perceptions of subsidiaries’ success or failure. Given our focus on managerial 
satisfaction, a natural candidate to add to the multi-theory approach is the behavioral 
theory  of  the  firm  (BTF).  After  all,  BTF’s  very  core  deals  with  how  managerial 
satisfaction  is  linked  to  adaptation  and  learning  (Greve,  2003).  Below,  we  will 
introduce the pieces of our multi-theory puzzle step by step, suggesting one specific 
hypothesis  for  each  of  our  five  theoretical  lenses.  Figure  1  summarizes  our  logic, 
linking the five theories to five key variables and the associated hypotheses. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
So,  this  paper’s  approach  is  eclectic.  Although  all  five  theories  share  similar 
assumptions (e.g., about bounded rationality and environmental contingencies), we will 
not really integrate them into an overall logic other than that they together suggest a set 
of  variables  that  may  well  influence  managerial  satisfaction  with  subsidiary 
performance. In future work, we hope to contribute to the development of integration 
by focusing, for instance, on possible interaction effects. In the context of the current 
paper,  though,  our  first  step  of  testing  a  series  of  main  effects  simultaneously  will 
suffice.  After  all,  as  far  as  we  know,  this  study  is  the  first  one  doing  that  as 
comprehensive as we propose here. 
 
Transaction Cost Theory: Ownership Stake 
The first line of argument is based upon straightforward transaction cost theory (TCT) 
logic. In transition economies, the effective transfer and implementation of non-capital 
resources, be they technical or organizational, often requires the involvement of the 
parents’  expatriates  because  of  shortages  of  local  labor  with  the  expertise  and 
experience  for  managing  these  processes  (Child,  2002).  In  CEE  acquisitions,  for   6 
example,  MNEs  either  inherit  “mediocre  assets  and  managers  who  lack  the  skill, 
resources,  and  expertise  to  manage  firms  in  competitive  market  environments” 
(Uhlenbruck et al., 2003: 258) or the magnitude of the required change exceeds many 
of local managers’ and employees’  cognitive  abilities (Newman, 2000). Uhlenbruck 
and De Castro (2000) provide evidence that MNEs in CEE tend to improve efficiency 
and  performance  because  of  the  capital,  new  technologies  and  management  skills 
provided to their local subsidiaries.  
Indeed,  the  transaction  cost  model  of  foreign  direct  investment  stresses  the 
importance of a firm’s intangible assets. Hennart (1991) notes that because the transfer 
of  knowledge  and  other  intangible-intensive  resources  comes  with  high  market 
transaction costs, parent firms typically prefer equity transactions. The argument is that 
the parent that supplies the most critical resources and has the greater expertise should 
obtain the ownership arrangement that would provide optimal incentives to invest the 
necessary assets that will contribute to subsidiary performance (Mjoen and Tallman, 
1997). Therefore, the more critical the strategic resources transferred abroad are, the 
more likely it is that the parent will desire whole ownership – or, if that is not possible, 
the highest possible level of ownership. As a mirror image, we have 
HYPOTHESIS  1  (ownership  stake):  A  greater  ownership  stake  is  positively 
associated with managerial satisfaction with the subsidiary’s performance. 
 
New Institutional Theory: Institutional Inefficiency  
The rise of new institutional theory (NIT) in social sciences dates back to the 1970s, but 
the ascendance of NIT as a leading perspective, is a more recent phenomenon (Wan and 
Hoskisson,  2003).  According  to  Peng  (2000),  research  on  emerging  economies  has 
helped propel the NIT perspective to the front line of the strategy research agenda. 
Hoskisson  et  al.  (2000)  content  that  although  NIT  presents  the  most  applicable 
paradigm for explaining firm behavior in emerging economies, the number of studies 
using an institutional perspective is rather limited. In the most recent review of NIT 
research, Wright et al. (2005: 6) conclude that the studies on firms from developed 
economies entering into emerging economies and analyzing the impact of institutions 
on foreign entrants’ strategies have “barely scratched the surface”. Moreover, regarding   7 
extant research on MNEs’ performance in European transition economies, to the best of 
our knowledge, only Uhlenbruck and DeCastro (2000) and Uhlenbruck (2004) took an 
institutional  approach.
4  Clearly,  the  richness  of  the  transition  setting  to  test  the 
applicability of western  strategies provided by emerging  economies is not  yet fully 
exploited. 
In comparison to the traditional transaction cost theory approach that focuses on 
“the  technical  environments  of  individual  transactions”  (Lu,  2002:  22),  new 
institutional theory emphasizes broader institutional contexts (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991). While both Williamson (1975) and North (1990) acknowledge the importance of 
transactions,  North  emphasizes  the  central  role  of  the  larger  environment  in 
constraining the optimality of a firm’s actions. The role of institutions in an economy is 
to  lessen  “both  transaction  and  information  costs  through  reducing  uncertainty  and 
establishing a stable structure that facilitates interactions” (Hoskisson et al., 2000: 253). 
The  relative  economic  and  social  stability  in  developed  countries  promotes  the 
development and acceptance of certain rules of exchange (Hitt et al., 2000). In contrast, 
the  rules  of  exchange  in  transition  economies  are  largely  emergent,  because  the 
institutional instability in such economies produces ambiguity and uncertainty (North, 
1990). Furthermore, market economy rules and requirements were not in place when 
the  communist  system  collapsed,  because  for  decades  markets  were  closed  and 
industries were protected (Peng, 2003).  
The  replacement  of  the  old  central  planning  regimes  with  market  economy 
mechanisms  requires  multifaceted  government  activities  to  secure  a  consistent 
transformation. Those activities range from restructuring and privatizing businesses to 
initiating  legal  and  institutional  reforms  to  establish  the  rule  of  law.  Furthermore, 
government  agencies  face  the  challenge  of  liberalizing  markets,  introducing 
competition policies, keeping inflation under control, and sustaining a viable financial 
sector and a foreign exchange regime that permits profit repatriation (IMF, 2000). CEE 
transition economies are currently at different stages of transformation, still to a certain 
extent being regulated, thus presenting an institutional environment that is profoundly 
different from what a typical Western firm would encounter in the developed world 
(Peng, 1994). MNEs in CEE emerging markets have to adopt strategies that fit with an   8 
institutional  environment  characterized  by  inefficiency,  instability  and  unreliability 
(Meyer, 2001). 
The  pace  of  dismantling  old  institutions  does  not  necessarily  coincide  with  the 
speed  of  constructing  new  institutions:  there  is  typically  a  period  of  incremental 
evolution  full  of  uncertainties  (Peng,  2003).  In  North’s  words  (1990:  6),  “although 
formal  rules  may  change  overnight  as  the  result  of  political  and  judicial  decisions, 
informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are much 
more impervious to deliberate policies”. Specifically, “informal constraints rise to play 
a larger role in regulating economic exchanges in these countries during the transition” 
(Peng and Heath, 1996: 504; emphasis added). Moreover, to combat uncertainty and to 
overcome  initial  inabilities  to  use  market  mechanisms,  economic  agents  in  CEE 
economies continued to rely on the inherited systems of personal networks that “earlier 
served to overcome  shortages under the central plan” (Meyer, 2001: 358). Personal 
networks  in  both  business  and  political  circles  have  retained  their  importance  as  a 
coordination mechanism during transition to a market economy (Puffer, 1996). Upon 
entering CEE, western MNEs often lack sufficient information about local partners, do 
not have effective personal networks in place, and face unclear regulatory frameworks, 
inexperienced  bureaucracies,  underdeveloped  court  systems,  weak  protection  of 
intellectual property and widespread corruption (Meyer, 2001).  
Any multinational expansion is typically challenging with respect to overcoming 
the  liability  of  foreignness  (Andersen,  1993;  Inkpen  and  Beamish,  1997)  because 
regulatory restrictions on foreign firms, among other factors, contribute to the costs of 
doing  business  abroad  (Zaheer,  1995a).  Expansion  into  transition  economies, 
characterized  by  institutional  inefficiency  and  environmental  turbulence,  is  perhaps 
more difficult, necessitating even greater efforts (Luo and Peng, 1999). Peng (2003: 
279)  contents  that  in  a  transition  environment,  the  costs  to  engage  in  relational 
contracting are high because transaction parties “need to build strong social networks 
through a time- and resource-consuming process.”  Thus, in addition to the transaction 
costs  associated  with  overcoming  liabilities  of  foreignness  and  managing  business 
operations  in  an  institutionally  volatile  environment,  western  MNEs  bear  additional 
costs related to an integration into diverse personal and government networks. Because   9 
of all the costs incurred, MNEs in the CEE region may experience dissatisfaction with 
their  subsidiary’s  performance  dependent  on  the  level  of  host-country  institutional 
inefficiency. Hence, we suggest 
HYPOTHESIS 2 (institutional inefficiency): The level of institutional inefficiency in 
terms  of  (a)  instability  and  (b)  corruption  of  a  host  country’s  institutional 
environment  is  negatively  associated  with  managerial  satisfaction  with  the 
subsidiary’s performance.  
 
Behavioral Theory of the Firm: Cultural Distance 
National culture relates to the unique ‘soft’ features of a host country’s ‘way of doing 
things’ (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2001). National cultural distance between countries 
has been associated with significant differences in their legal systems, administrative 
practices  and  working  styles  (Hofstede,  1980;  Shane,  1992).  Extensive  empirical 
research  has  shown  that  the  greater  the  national  cultural  distance,  the  larger  the 
difference in terms of routines and practices (Hofstede, 1980; Morosini et al., 1998). 
For  instance,  routines  and  practices  related  to  innovation  have  been  found  to  vary 
significantly  across  countries  along  Hofstede’s  (1980)  “individualism-collectivism” 
dimension (Shane, 1993). As  a result, the organizational routines and practices that 
create firms’ competitive advantages are often constrained by national culture (Kogut 
and Singh, 1988; Hofstede et al., 1990), and therefore difficult to replicate in other 
national cultures (Barney, 1986). 
International  business  literature  suggests  that  cultural  differences  deteriorate  the 
applicability of MNEs’ capabilities in the local environment (Barney, 1991; Madhok, 
1997), yet extant empirical support for this argument is scarce. Barkema et al. (1996) 
suggest that failure rates among foreign subsidiaries increase with cultural distance. 
Very  et  al.  (1997)  state  that  dissimilarity  between  merging  firms’  national  cultures 
negatively  affects  post-merger  performance.  Li  and  Guisinger  (1991)  find  that  the 
failure  of  US  affiliates  is  significantly  higher  if  the  parent  company  is  based  in  a 
culturally distant country rather than a culturally similar country. In contrast, O’Grady 
and  Lane  (1996)  argue  that  operating  in  a  psychically
5  close  country  does  not 
necessarily  lead  to  superior  performance,  as  the  assumption  of  similarity  prevents   10 
executives from detecting subtle but important differences in the foreign market. Evans 
and  Mavondo  (2002)  arrive  at  similar  conclusions:  psychic,  cultural  and  business 
distance  positively  influence  performance,  because  firms  originating  from  similar 
markets may find it difficult to establish a clear basis for differentiation.  
The behavioral theory of the firm posits an alternative explanation of a positive 
relationship between cultural distance and satisfaction with organizational performance. 
Cyert and March (1963) and March (1994) argue that managers evaluate organizational 
performance  relative  to  their  “aspiration  level”.  An  aspiration  level,  in  Schneider’s 
(1992: 1053) words, is “the smallest outcome that would be deemed satisfactory by the 
decision maker”, and is used by decision-makers to determine the boundary between 
success  and  failure  when  evaluating  performance.  It  appears  that  managers  assess 
performance  as  being  either  high  or  low  by  comparing  it  with  an  aspiration  level 
(Greve,  2003).  The  process  of  decision-making  in  uncertain  environments  revolves 
around a cycle of environmental scanning, interpretation and learning (Daft and Weick, 
1984).  Managers  interpret  received  information  by  using  their  “cognitive  schemata, 
structures that encode past experiences and guide future actions” (Greve and Taylor, 
2000: 55), and learn by either continued exploitation of their current activities or by 
introducing explorative change (March, 1991). Differences in patterns of beliefs and 
values manifested in practices, behaviors and artifacts of culturally distant countries are 
typically  obstructing  information  analysis,  subsequent  interpretation  of  firms’ 
experience and consequent learning processes.  
Due to such constraints, international managers may naturally develop low-level 
aspirations  and  expectations  that  eventually  result  in  an  easier  satisfaction  with 
subsidiary performance. Moreover, because subjective performance evaluation is highly 
dependent on the managers’ aspiration level, their perception of success depends on 
how the aspiration level is adjusted over time (Greve, 2003). Evidence suggests that 
aspiration levels are updated slowly, with recent performance given low weight relative 
to the prior aspiration level: Elsbach and Kramer (1996) report empirical evidence that 
managers are quick to explain performance downturns with reference to faults of the 
measurement criteria. Therefore, we may expect that with respect to culturally distant 
subsidiaries,  the  initial  low  aspiration/expectation  level  that  results  in  an  easy   11 
satisfaction  with performance,  will  most  likely  be  sustained  for  some  time,  even if 
updated with less encouraging performance estimates. Hence, we have 
HYPOTHESIS 3 (cultural distance): National cultural distance between the MNE’s 
country  of  origin  and  the  host  nation  is  positively  associated  with  managerial 
satisfaction with the subsidiary’s performance. 
 
Resource-Based Theory: Intangibles Intensity 
The  resource-based  theory  (RBT)  postulates  that  because  intangible  assets  such  as 
technological know-how, patents, management skills, brand names and best practices 
are information intensive, transactions with such assets are subject to market failures. 
Hence, intangible assets’ internalization becomes critical for their efficient exploitation 
(Lu  and  Beamish,  2004).  Firms’  intangible  assets  encompass  an  array  of  unique 
characteristics: their development is capital, human and time-resource intensive, they 
can be applied in new markets at a proportionally smaller cost due to economies of 
scope,  and  international  exploitation  does  not  diminish  their  home  market  value 
(Dierickx  and  Cool,  1989;  Delios  and  Beamish,  2001).  When  deployed  abroad, 
knowledge-based intangible assets provide rent-yielding advantages for MNEs (Caves, 
1971), also because they give the foreign subsidiary a superior competitive position in 
the local marketplace (Isobe et al., 2000; Delios and Beamish, 2001). Morck and Yeung 
(1992) and Mishra and Gobeli (1998) empirically support this argument: they find a 
positive  relationship  between  MNEs’  possession  of  intangible  assets  and  their 
subsidiaries’  market  value.  Likewise,  Delios  and  Beamish  (2001)  report  a  positive 
relationship between MNEs’ intangible asset endowments and the likelihood of their 
subsidiaries’ survival.  
Extant research suggests that the competitive advantages of MNEs frequently stem 
from  offering  highly  innovative  and  highly  differentiated  products  (Oviatt  and 
McDougall,  1994).  Due  to  a  technology  gap  between  firms  from  more  developed 
markets and firms from transition countries, MNEs’ technological intensity offers an 
advantage in transition economies (Svetlicic and Rojec, 1994). Because this gap tends 
to be quite large, local firms in CEE transition countries cannot compete in product 
technologies  with  firms  originating  from  developed  market  countries.  They  cannot   12 
develop or offer new and sophisticated products in sufficient quantity and ditto quality 
to be competitive vis-à-vis firms from developed countries (Hitt et al., 2000). Thus, 
firms originating from developed economies are typically in possession of relatively 
complex technologies that, when transferred to transition economy subsidiaries, provide 
competitive advantages.  
In addition, by transferring marketing skills abroad MNEs often seek to generate 
firm-specific  assets  in  the  form  of  brand  recognition  and  product  differentiation  in 
foreign markets (Denekamp, 1995). Evidence shows that firms recognized as leaders in 
marketing activities often try to gain market power by defeating competitors in foreign 
markets, aggressively creating brand-name loyalty and establishing their products as 
industry standards (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994). In contrast, for many decades CEE 
enterprises  have  shared  organizational  cultures  that  promoted  production  under 
centralized instruction rather than market demand, being  characterized by consumer 
neglect. In such organizational cultures, there was typically limited – if any – use of 
marketing techniques. Clearly, marketing-intensive MNEs can benefit from a reduced 
level of local competition because re-programming obsolete organizational practices is 
difficult, takes time and is not always successful (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). In 
this  line  of  argument,  we  expect  MNEs’  competitive  advantage,  stemming  from 
technological and/or marketing intensity, to be favorably exploited by their subsidiaries 
in  CEE  countries.  Launching  a  technologically  or  marketing-intensive  product  will 
create  a  competitive  advantage  over  local  competition,  thus  positively  influencing 
satisfaction with performance. Hence,   
HYPOTHESIS 4 (intangibles intensity): The MNE’s intangibles intensity in terms of 
(a)  technological  and  (b)  advertising  intensity  is  positively  associated  with 
managerial satisfaction with the subsidiary’s performance.  
 
International Management Theory: International Strategy 
International  strategy,  a  key  issue  in  international  management  theory  (IMT),  is  a 
means  to  exploit  the  firm’s  competitive  advantages  and  establish  complementary 
organizational capabilities (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001). Considering the complexity 
of  the  MNE’s  organizational  form,  there  is  a  clear  necessity  for  reducing  this   13 
complexity  into  a  manageable  number  of  related  characteristics  to  understand  and 
explain MNEs’ functions and behaviors (Harzing, 2000). To do so, we adopt the well-
known  typology  approach  of  Bartlett  and  Ghoshal  (1989),  along  the  lines  of  their 
integration-responsiveness  framework
6  and  Dunning’s  (1980)  eclectic  theory  of 
international  production,  to  examine  to  what  extent  following  a  global  or  a 
multidomestic international strategy may affect managerial satisfaction with subsidiary 
performance.   
Global companies promote a convergence of consumers’ preferences and strive to 
maximize standardization of production (Rugman and Verbeke, 1992). They benefit 
from home-country specific advantages, which can be efficiently transferred to foreign 
locations by creating “replicas” of the parent company (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). 
Harzing (2000 & 2002) reports that global companies tend to exercise tight control over 
subsidiaries  to  preserve  parents’  corporate  culture,  exploit  their  unique  core 
competencies and funnel strategic decisions on production and marketing to the outlets. 
In contrast, multidomestic firms develop strategies for national responsiveness. Due to 
significant  competitive  differences  between  countries,  a  multidomestic  strategy  is 
determined by local cultural, political and social characteristics (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1989).  Products  and  policies  conform  to  different  local  demands  and  the  MNE’s 
activities are usually “tied to the buyer’s location” (Harzing, 1999: 39). In order to 
fulfill the requirements for market-specific product customization, multidomestic firms 
must  be  aware  of  the  specificity  of  local  markets,  policies  and  production  nuances 
(Harzing, 2000). Thus, the primary objective then is the adaptation of marketing and 
production strategies to specific local customer needs and government requirements. 
Wright et al. (2005) raise a question that has, to date, not been fully addressed by 
research: can an MNE’s global strategy be extended and adapted with minimal changes 
to emerging economies? Or does a focus on emerging economies call for more strategic 
attention and tailor-made business models? Maybe a simple adaptation and extension of 
the  traditional  global  strategy  will  not  be  sufficient  in  transition  economies:  an 
investment without understanding how location specificity affects firms and customers 
might not produce the anticipated positive results. Overall, emerging economies present 
a challenge to the global strategy concept (Wright et al., 2005). The traditional global   14 
strategy is built on business models profiting from “the top of the global pyramid” – 
i.e.,  about  a  billion  customers,  mostly  in  the  developed  world  –,  whereas  business 
models in emerging economies have to be based on profiting from the bottom of the 
global pyramid – that is, four billion people each making less than 2000 US$ a year 
(Prahalad  and  Hammond,  2002).  Clearly,  there  are  points  of  convergence  between 
developed  and  emerging  economies,  but  if  Western  MNEs  only  considered  extant 
similarities, they may find themselves “trapped by their devices in gilded cages, serving 
the affluent few but ignoring the potential of the billions of new customers that attracted 
them  in  the  first  place”  (Dawar  and  Chattopadhyay,  2002:  457).  Perhaps  a 
multidomestic  approach,  which  incorporates  market  specificities  and  compromises 
between value and price, will prove to be the winning strategic solution for markets in 
transition.      
Dunning’s  (1980)  eclectic  theory  of  international  production  postulates  that  the 
most  prominent  motives  for  foreign  direct  investment  are  those  related  to  market-
seeking and/or factor-seeking strategies. MNEs that choose to pursue an export-oriented 
strategy are typically corporations that operate on a global basis, favoring a higher level 
of vertical integration  to serve them  as  a  tool to cut  production  costs by intra-firm 
exchange of production components. Global firms can leverage across various business 
opportunities because they are fit to move their production across countries in order to 
seek  for  the  most  competitive  workers,  suppliers  and  technologies  (Bartlett  and 
Ghoshal, 1989), or to respond to exchange rate movements, minimize taxes and avoid 
financial restrictions imposed by local governments (Kumar, 1994). Although global 
MNEs  have  an  access  to  information  on  world  markets,  which  makes  them  well 
equipped  to  counteract  uncertainties  and  fluctuations,  they  are  less  fit  to  adapt  to 
changes in the local market structure. Business operations in transition economies are 
subject to various risks and uncertainties (high inflation, unstable financial sector and 
foreign  exchange  regimes,  et  cetera).  Therefore,  an  exclusively  global  focus  and  a 
neglect of local specificities could result in underperformance of the local subsidiaries 
due to underdeveloped  capabilities to counteract environmental volatilities (Pan and 
Chi, 1999).    15 
In contrast, firms that adopt a foreign market entry strategy that aims at establishing 
a sustainable local market presence tend to adapt strategies to better respond to local 
consumer preferences. These are typically MNEs following a multidomestic strategy, 
characterized by a primary concern with adaptation of operations and strategies. Unique 
market  knowledge  is  accumulated  during  the  process  of  customizing  production, 
marketing  and  management  activities.  Consequently,  multidomestic  MNEs  develop 
capabilities to react promptly to local environmental changes and market fluctuations. 
In several surveys among MNEs in CEE, seventy-five percent of the surveyed firms 
stated that the primary reason for investment was reflected in market-seeking motives, 
rather than manufacturing-for-export purposes (Heimpohl et al., 1993). It could be that 
expectations of reduced competition in the region, in addition to the associated better 
performance  of  Western  firms,  have  further  encouraged  market-seeking  entry 
(Uhlenbruck, 1997).  
Based  on  the  above  arguments,  we  argue  that  there  is  a  need  for  profound 
understanding of local market forces and specificities to build a successful operation in 
CEE  countries.  Therefore,  MNEs  following  a  multidomestic  type  of  strategy  have 
greater  chances  for  success  than  MNEs  following  a  predominantly  global  strategy. 
Hence,  MNEs’  investments  to  establish  a  market  presence  will  result  in  greater 
satisfaction  with  the  subsidiary’s  performance  than  MNEs’  investments  in  export-
oriented production Thus, we propose 
HYPOTHESIS  5  (international  strategy):  (a)  MNEs  following  a  multidomestic 
strategy  will  be  more  satisfied  with  their  subsidiary’s  performance  than  those 
following a global strategy; and (b) a market-focused investment will be positively 
associated with managerial satisfaction with the subsidiary’s performance.  
 
METHODS 
Data 
To test the above hypotheses, an international mail survey was conducted in May 2003 
among companies from the European Union (EU) that either acquired an existing local 
enterprise or had invested in a greenfield subsidiary in CEE. We initially selected from 
the  AMADEUS  dataset  all  registered  companies  based  in  the  then-fifteen  member   16 
states of the EU that had established subsidiaries in CEE between 1992 and 2002, and 
that had at least a 10 per cent
7 ownership stake in a subsidiary located in any of the 
following  ten  transition  economies:  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary, 
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Romania,  Slovakia  and  Slovenia.  These  countries  were 
chosen for this study because of the multifaceted economic and political significance of 
their 2004 and 2007 accession to the European Union.  
An English-language questionnaire was created and pilot tested with managers in 
four Dutch  companies  who  were  competent in both the  English  language  and their 
firm’s international expansions into CEE. The final English-language questionnaire was 
then back translated into German (for German and Austrian companies), French (for 
French and Belgian companies) and Italian. In total, 2,798 questionnaires were initially 
mailed to west European CEOs at the MNEs’ headquarters with a request to have the 
questionnaires  completed  by  a  business  unit  top  manager  accountable  for  and 
knowledgeable of the latest CEE expansion. From this, 35 questionnaires were returned 
as non-deliverable.  After  compressing  the targeted firms to 2,763, we received 209 
usable questionnaires, representing an overall response rate of 7.5 per cent. We further 
excluded the observations from Latvia and Lithuania due to unavailable data on cultural 
distances for these two countries, thus reducing the sample to 198 subsidiaries. The 
response varies from 64 for Poland to 5 for Slovenia. 
We  tested  the  collected  data  for  non-response  bias.  We  conducted  a  t-test 
comparing the firm size variable (number of employees worldwide) of our sample to a 
random  selection  of  the  relevant  MNE  population,  which  revealed  no  statistically 
significant differences in the two means. Although we have a mix of predictors derived 
from  primary  and  secondary-data  sources,  we  also  performed  a  common-method 
variance test. According to Podsakoff and Organ (1986), if all variables load on one 
factor  or  there  is  one  factor  that  explains  the  majority  of  the  variance,  there  is  a 
common-method problem. We performed a factor analysis by entering all dependent 
and independent variables used in this study. Because the factor analysis resulted in a 
four-factor solution with the largest factor explaining 22 per cent of the variance only, 
we consider our data unconfined by common-method variance. 
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Dependent variables    
The  dependent  variable  of  this  study,  managerial  satisfaction  with  subsidiary’s 
performance,  was  captured  using  subjective  measures.  Due  to  unavailable  or 
inaccessible official financial reports for every subsidiary in all ten CEE countries for 
the time period from 1992 to 2002, we were unable to collect objective measures of 
performance  at  the  subsidiary  level.  Furthermore,  in  studies  involving  firms  from 
multiple home  countries investing in  multiple  host countries, objective  measures  of 
performance  may  suffer  from  interpretation  errors  and  measurement  noise  due  to 
dissimilar  accounting  practices,  differences  in  reporting  company-level  data  and 
exchange  rate  fluctuations  (Brouthers  et  al.,  1999;  Brouthers  and  Brouthers,  2000). 
Based  on  the  experience  with  anonymous  surveys  by  Woodcock  et  al.  (1994)  and 
Brouthers et al. (1999), who reported the unwillingness of firms to provide objective 
measures  of  performance  for  their  foreign  subsidiaries,  we  employed  managerial 
evaluations to measure satisfaction with performance.  
Subjective measures can be used to proxy performance against multiple financial 
and non-financial criteria (Dess and Robinson, 1984). Subjective financial measures of 
performance provide valuable insights into the estimated achievements of the firm’s 
economic objectives (Brouthers, 2002). To limit the effect of recall and memory bias, 
we  inquired  about  the  MNEs’  most  recent  investment  in  CEE.  We  received  a 
substantial number of questionnaires referring to investments made after the year 2000, 
which made financial measures of performance of limited importance, further justifying 
the introduction of subjective non-financial measures. After all, in the early stages of 
high-risk  investments  in  such  inefficient  CEE  environments,  objective  financial 
performance  indicators  are  not  that  important.  However,  non-financial  measures  of 
performance provide important information about the firm’s competitive and strategic 
goals because managers tend to judge success or failure in terms of to-be-accomplished 
objectives (Anderson, 1990). Therefore, even in the early stages of a new enterprise’s 
existence,  managers  can  evaluate  the  progress  of  meeting  such  pre-set  objectives 
(Brouthers, 2002).  
We adopted the approach of previous studies and asked respondents to rate their 
satisfaction along eight performance dimensions: sales level, sales growth, profitability,   18 
market  share,  marketing,  distribution,  reputation,  and  market  access  (Geringer  and 
Hebert,  1991;  Brouthers  et  al.,  1999,  2000  &  2002).  Respondents  evaluated  each 
performance  measure  on  a  scale  ranging  from  1,  “very  dissatisfied”,  to  10,  “very 
satisfied”.  To  assess  the  dimensionality  of  managers’  satisfaction  with  subsidiary’s 
performance and to reduce the number of variables, we performed a factor analysis. The 
results are reported in Table 1. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Using principle components analysis with the conventional eigenvalue cut-off level of 
one, we were able to extract two factors, which have a significant factor loading above 
0.50  (Hair  et  al.,  1995).  The  first  factor,  named  “satisfaction  with  financial 
performance” or Financial Performance, has substantial loadings for sales level, sales 
growth  and  profitability.  The  second  factor,  labeled  “satisfaction  with  marketing 
performance”  or  Marketing  Performance,  has  substantial  loadings  for  reputation, 
market access, distribution and marketing. The variable “market share” was excluded 
from  the  analysis  because  it  loaded  substantially  on  both  factors  (0.51  and  0.63, 
respectively). Note that we refrain from formulating separate sets of hypotheses for 
both types of performance satisfaction measures. Given lack of earlier work on this, we 
will  simply  run  separate  regressions  for  our  financial  and  marketing  performance 
satisfaction measures to explore whether or not any interpretable differences will occur. 
 
Independent variables 
Our hypotheses relate to the influence of eight independent variables, in total. The first 
hypothesis is a straightforward transaction cost theory one, focusing on the impact of 
ownership stake of the Western MNE in the local CEE subsidiary. Ownership Stake 
was determined through the survey by inquiring about the actual percentage of foreign 
ownership in the CEE subsidiary.  
The second hypothesis deals with the effect of institutional inefficiency. Here, we 
used two measures. For one, we created a series of five-point Likert-type of questions 
(with  answers  ranging  from  very low to  very high) inquiring  about  (a) the general   19 
stability of host country’s political and social institutions, (b) barriers to conversion and 
repatriation of income, (c) level of corruption of political leaders, (d) ability of host 
country’s government to enforce existing laws, (e) efficiency of government agencies 
and institutions, and (f) legal restrictions to foreign ownership. High values demonstrate 
perceived  Institutional  Instability.  The  scale’s  high  Cronbach’s  alpha  coefficient 
indicates internal consistency (α = .74, which is above the .7 cut-off level). Moreover, 
to  guarantee  the  robustness  of  our  analyses,  we  included  an  institutional  variable 
derived  from  a  secondary  source,  namely  the  2004  Transparency  International 
Corruption Perception Index (http://www.transparency.org), or CPI. We calculated an 
Institutional  Corruption  score  by  measuring  the  distance  in  corruption  estimates 
between home  and host countries. For every observation in our sample, that is, we 
subtracted the CPI score of the host nation from the CPI score of the relevant home 
country.  We  chose  the  CPI  source  to  measure  the  inefficiency  of  the  institutional 
environment for two reasons. For one, according to recent research by the World Bank 
and the EBRD, corruption is often portrayed as the major institutional constraint on 
business (Hellman et al., 2000). A secondary reason for choosing the CPI source is that 
there  exist  high  correlations  between  CPI  scores  and  other  potential  measures  of  a 
country’s  institutional  inefficiency.  For  example,  Brouthers  and  colleagues  (2004) 
report that the Euromoney risk measure is highly correlated with the CPI (r = .70), the 
EBRD  measure  of  institutional  factors  (r  =  .88),  the  World  Bank’s  institutional 
measures (r = .79) and Henisz’s political constraints measure (r = .85).  
For  our third  hypothesis,  Cultural  Distance  was  measured  following  Kogut  and 
Singh’s  (1988) formula, based on Hofstede’s (2001) updated national culture scores. 
To date, Hofstede’s study is the only one providing cultural distance indices for the 
CEE nations central in this study. Kogut and Singh (1988) defined national cultural 
distance  as  the  degree to which  cultural  norms in  one country differ from those in 
another  country.  A  number  of  authors  followed  up  on  this  definition  by  providing 
empirical evidence on the direct association of critical routines and repertoires within 
firms in different countries with the national cultural distance between them (Hofstede, 
1980 & 2001; Shane, 1993; Morosini et al., 1998; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). 
Shane  (1995)  and  Morosini  and  colleagues  (1998)  express  concerns  about  the   20 
occurrence of common-method variance when individuals answer questions about their 
cultural values and the effect of those values (in our case, on their satisfaction with 
performance). However, a correlation between Hofstede’s cultural distance indices and 
the satisfaction with performance scores derived from our survey cannot be an artifact 
of a common-source bias, by definition. Furthermore, due to a natural tendency toward 
ethnocentricity and a preference for similarity, interviewed managers might recall the 
national culture of the target country as being more similar to their own than it really is. 
Using the natural culture scores from a source external to our sample and not dependent 
on  the  memory  of  the  respondents,  we  avoid  this  problem  of  retrospective 
rationalization (Morosini et al., 1998). 
Relating to our fourth hypothesis, Caves (1996) noted that R&D and advertising 
intensities  have  emerged  as  the  most  robust  measures  of  intangible  assets  in  the 
literature on MNEs. Therefore, we adopted the two measures of this pair of intangible 
assets  most  commonly  used  in  the  literature  (Morck  and  Yeung,  1991;  Delios  and 
Beamish, 1999; Lu and Beamish, 2004). Technological Intensity is obtained by asking 
the respondents a five-point Likert-type of question as to the percentage of sales spent 
on  R&D  (ranging  from  very  low  to  very  high),  because  it  was  believed  that  the 
surveyed  sample  of  managers  would  be  unlikely  to  answer  adequately  or  at  all 
questions regarding a monetary estimation of the annual R&D budget. Following the 
same logic, we obtained Advertising Intensity by asking the respondents a five-point 
Likert-type of question as to the percentage of sales spent on marketing and advertising 
activities. The decision to use primary data to proxy both intensity variables was based 
mostly  on  pragmatic  reasons:  official  secondary  data  on  R&D  and  advertising 
expenditures for all surveyed firms were simply unavailable.  
With respect to our fifth hypothesis, an International Strategy measure was obtained 
by  asking  two  sets  of  multi-scale  questions  describing  multidomestic  and  global 
strategies. The questions were adapted from Harzing (2000 & 2002), who constructed 
four  statements  that  measure  whether  international  competition  in  the  industry  of 
investment is predominantly global and focused on achieving economies of scale or 
multidomestic  and  aiming  at  local  differentiation.  We  performed  a  cluster  analysis, 
which resulted in a two-cluster grouping of the four constructs as multidomestic and   21 
global, and performed an independent-samples t-test to check for significant difference 
in the mean scores of the two groups. Clearly, the profiles of the multidomestic and 
global strategies are significantly different, along the lines expected by the theory, as is 
clear from Table 2. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The type of international strategy is captured by a dummy variable taking the value of 1 
if the  strategy  is  predominantly  multidomestic,  and  0  if  it  is  predominantly global. 
Furthermore, to obtain our Market Focus variable, we asked respondents two questions 
referring  to  their  strategic  intentions  to  enter  into  the  respective  market:  is  their 
investment aimed at either establishing a local presence to supply the host market, or at 
setting up a low-cost production site for export purposes (Meyer, 1998). We defined a 
dummy variable with a value of 1 if the investment had a market focus, and 0 if it had 
an export-oriented focus.  
 
Control variables 
Eight control variables were included. For one, we asked for the Establishment Mode – 
i.e., the choice between a greenfield establishment or an acquisition mode. According to 
several studies, performance of greenfields should be systematically better than that of 
acquisitions (Woodcock et al., 1994; Li, 1995), while others suggest differently based 
on the assumption that because acquisitions are less risky than greenfields, the former 
should outperform the latter (Pennings et al., 1994; Caves, 1996). Regardless of the 
divergent findings in earlier work, it is clear that the two establishment modes might 
well have different performance implications.  
We follow the reasoning of Padmanabhan and Cho (1999), who argue that once the 
decision to invest in a foreign country has been made, as opposed to a non-equity entry, 
international experience (or level of multinationality) becomes less important than other 
types of experience. Unlike previous studies that tested for the effect of multinationality 
on performance, we introduce three alternative measures of international experience. 
First, we included Acquisition Experience, comprised of a composite measure of the 
number of acquisitions and the number of countries that hosted them. Second, a similar   22 
composite  measure  –  Greenfield  Experience  –  controls  for  the  number  of  foreign 
greenfield establishments. Third, a Regional Experience control variable, measured as 
the  number  of  years  experience  doing  business  in  any  CEE  country,  was  taken  on 
board. All information is from the questionnaire. 
Christensen  and  Montgomery  (1981)  associated  performance  effects  specifically 
with relative industry growth. Hence, we included a host country’s Industry Growth 
rate variable. Due to the heterogeneity of our observations and the significant range of 
industries of investment, secondary data on industry growth in all host countries were 
either unavailable or incomparable. Therefore, we obtained our industry growth control 
variable by asking the respondents to estimate, with a five-point Likert-type answer 
scale, the host country’s growth rate of the industry of their investment.  
Finally, we include three standard control variables. Previous research has found 
that firm size influences performance: an individual subsidiary is less important to a 
large firm than to a relatively small one, and therefore may receive less attention and 
support (Slangen, 2005). We control for Firm Size through the approximate number of 
their MNE’s employees worldwide. Furthermore, years of experience in a particular 
industry sector in a given host country are expected to exert a substantial influence on 
performance  (Oliver,  1997).  To  control  for  such  experience,  we  created  a  variable 
Subsidiary Age by  calculating the years of  existence since the establishment  of the 
subsidiary.  To  control  for  the  Industry  Type,  we  used  the  OECD  classification  of 
manufacturing industries based on technology, and created three dummy variables: a 
first dummy for high and medium-high technology industries, a second dummy for 
medium-low and low-technology industries, and a the third dummy for all industries 
that  fall  outside  the  OECD  categorization  (for  example,  service  firms,  building 
contractors, agricultural producers and wholesalers). The primary information about the 
industry of investment is obtained through the survey. 
 
Statistical methods 
To test our hypotheses, we performed two ordinary least-squares multiple regression 
analyses with SPSS 11.0, one for the financial and one for the marketing performance 
satisfaction measure. To reveal the explanatory power of our independent variables as a   23 
set, we ran two models – Models 1 and 3 – with the control variables only, before 
adding  our  independent  variables  in  Models  2  and  4.  Table  3  reports  the  usual 
descriptives. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Two  correlation  coefficients  stand  out:  .664  between  two  industry  classification 
dummies, and .557 between the two dependent variables. For each of the regression 
runs,  variance-inflation  factors  (VIF)  were  examined  to  determine  any  potential 
multicollinearity bottleneck. All of the VIF scores were below 2, thus confirming that 
multicollenearity is not an issue here (Hair et al., 1995). Tests for heteroskedasticity and 
correlation of error terms showed that neither of these problems were present in the 
data. 
 
RESULTS 
The results of the regression analyses are shown in Table 4.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Clearly, the full models perform much better than the models with control variables 
only. As far as the control variables is concerned, half of them are not associated with 
significant estimates at all: Establishment mode, Firm size, Subsidiary age and Industry 
type are apparently unrelated to managerial satisfaction with subsidiary performance. In 
both  Marketing  Performance  regressions,  only  Acquisition  experience  and  Industry 
growth  reach  significance:  with  more  acquisition  experience  and  higher  industry 
growth,  managers  are  more  satisfied  with  the  marketing  performance  of  their 
subsidiaries. In the full Financial Performance Model 4, the estimates for Greenfield 
experience (negative), Industry growth (positive) and Regional experience (positive) 
are significant. The results for our three experience measures point to a particularly 
interesting avenue for future research.   24 
We  observe  significant  differences  between  the  results  for  both  performance 
measures,  comparing  Models  2  and  4:  the  variance  explained  in  the  Marketing 
Performance  satisfaction  regression  is  much  higher  than  the  one  in  the  Financial 
Performance counterpart. In addition, the contribution of the independent variables in 
our fourth model, demonstrated by the values of the beta coefficients, is much lower 
than in the second model. It could be that the results of the Marketing Performance 
analysis carry more explanatory power because of the methodology applied: managers’ 
opinion  of  a  subsidiary’s  financial  performance  (sales  growth,  sales  level  and 
profitability)  measured  with  a  Likert-type  of  question  is  perhaps  less  accurate  and 
representative  than  the  “real”  picture  presented  by  officially  published  or internally 
available financial reports. 
More  importantly,  the  stronger  explanatory  power  of  our  predictors  in  the 
Marketing  Performance  analysis  possibly  suggests  that  subjective  measures  of  non-
financial performance, as opposed to subjective financial estimates, may be of greater 
strategic  importance  for  the  subsidiaries’  managers.  From  a  long-term  strategy 
perspective, subsidiary’s performance in the sense of distribution, marketing, market 
access and reputation may be more valuable for the parent MNE than the short-term 
growth  or  profitability  of  the  outlet.  Several  authors  have  argued  that  foreign 
investments may not be undertaken solely to increase short-run financial performance 
(Anderson, 1990; Geringer and Hebert, 1991). They suggest that increased financial 
performance may not occur for a number of years after initial foreign market entry, but 
that other  measures  of  performance may help to  determine the  effectiveness  of  the 
investment. This argument may hold true particularly in high-risk and “young” markets 
such as those in CEE. 
Model 2 tests the hypothesized effects of our predictors on managerial satisfaction 
with  the  subsidiary’s  Marketing  Performance.  The  Ownership  stake  coefficient  is 
positive  and  significant,  offering  support  for  Hypothesis  1.  Both  the  Institutional 
instability and Cultural distance predictors are significant and have the expected sign, 
thus providing support for Hypothesis 2a and 3. Hypothesis 2b is rejected, given the 
non-significant  estimate  of  the  Institutional  corruption  coefficient.  Hypothesis  4  is 
partially  supported  –  i.e.,  Hypothesis  4b  is  confirmed,  but  Hypothesis  4a  is  not:   25 
Advertising  intensity  is  significantly  and  positively  related  to  satisfaction  with 
Marketing Performance, whilst Technological intensity is significantly but negatively 
related  to  satisfaction  with  Marketing  Performance  (which  is  opposite  to  what  was 
expected).  Hypothesis  5a  is  supported:  the  coefficient  of  the  International  strategy 
variable is positive and significant, as hypothesized. The significance of our Market 
focus predictor and its positive sign offer support for Hypothesis 5b. 
In  Model  4,  we  analyze  managers’  satisfaction  with  Financial  Performance. 
Hypothesis  1  is  not  supported,  as  the  coefficient  estimate  for  the  Ownership  stake 
variable  fails  to  reach  significance.  Hypothesis  2  is  partially  confirmed,  due  to  the 
significance and expected sign of the Institutional corruption estimate (Hypothesis 2b) 
but the insignificant coefficient for the Institutional instability variable. Hypothesis 3 is 
supported:  the  Cultural  distance  coefficient  is  significantly  positive.  Hypothesis  4 
receives  partial  support,  due  to  the  unexpected  negative  sign  of  the  Technological 
intensity coefficient (Hypothesis 4a) and the expected positive and significant estimate 
for  the  Advertising  intensity  variable  (Hypothesis  4b).  The  coefficient  of  the 
International  strategy  variable  has  the  expected  sign,  but  is  insignificant.  Hence, 
Hypothesis 5a cannot be supported. Our Market focus predictor is not significant in the 
fourth model either: therefore, Hypothesis 5b is rejected, too. 
     
DISCUSSION 
Tan  and  Litschert  (1994)  suggest  that  the  environment  in  transition  economies, 
characterized by a weak regulatory regime, underdeveloped factor markets and poorly 
protected property rights, is typically hostile to business. In such contexts, transactions 
costs are likely to be high, which is why a large ownership stake is needed to reach a 
satisfactory level of performance. Indeed, we find support for this argument for the case 
of satisfaction with marketing performance, but not for the financial performance case. 
Our  interpretation  is  that  this  asymmetric  result  can  be  explained  by  the  relative 
unimportance of short-run financial performance objectives for many FDI entries into a 
high-risk region such as CEE, particularly in the early stages after entry. 
Studies have concluded that legal efficiency is positively correlated with the role of 
the  court  system,  and  that  malfunctions  regarding  corporate  governance  have  high   26 
explanatory  power  for  the  mediocre  performance  of  the  private  sector  in  transition 
economies  (Johnson  et  al.,  1999).  In  the  case  of  CEE,  EUMAP  (Open  Society 
Institute’s  EU  Monitoring  and  Advocacy  Program)  acknowledges  the  impressive 
progress towards establishing democracy, the rule of law and a market economy in the 
region. However, it points out that the inherited tradition of entrenched mistrust of the 
state is conductive to the persistence of corruption. According to the 2002 EBRD report 
on transition, the level of government corruption in CEE is still very high: for example, 
the percentage of firms frequently bribing public officials is as high as 22.6 in Hungary 
and 36.7 in Romania. A possible explanation for the high levels of corruption in the 
region  is  the  nature  of  the  transition  process:  all  CEE  countries  have  undertaken 
transitional tasks that are inherently vulnerable to corruption, including the privatization 
of their entire economies (EUMAP, 2005).  
In  the  2002  and  2003  reports  on  progress  with  EU  accession,  the  European 
Commission  makes  frequent  references  to  problems  with  corruption,  because  they 
impede  the  smooth  functioning  of  the  single  market,  the  quality  of  democratic 
institutions and the core democratic values the EU seeks to represent. Furthermore, with 
the  accession  of  the  first  eight  CEE  countries,  the  EU  has  admitted  a  number  of 
countries  with  persistent  and  serious  problems  of  corruption  (EUMAP,  2005).  The 
magnitude  of  the  problem  is  further  emphasized  by  EU’s  annual  declaration  on 
candidate states, which recommends a “safeguard clause”, possibly delaying accession 
of either Bulgaria or Romania if their judicial reforms stall. The document concludes 
that while both candidates continue to fulfill the political criteria for EU membership, 
there is a dire need for improvements in the reforms of their public administration, the 
functioning  of  their  judicial  system  and  the  fight  against  corruption  (Sofia  News 
Agency, 2004). Clearly, the empirical evidence provided in this study further supports 
these  arguments,  revealing  that  institutional  deficiencies  in  the  CEE  region  have  a 
preponderating negative effect on local economies and foreign investments: because 
institutional inefficiency has a negative effect on the western managers’ satisfaction 
with their subsidiary’s performance, we conclude that institutional inefficiency indeed 
presents a considerable impediment to business.    27 
We provide further support for Uhlenbruck’s (2003) suggestion that culture remains 
a prominent issue even during the turbulent economic transition process: our empirical 
analyses reveal that cultural distance strongly influences managers’ satisfaction with 
their subsidiary’s performance. Previously, studies on the effects on performance of 
cultural differences between two countries reveal that the more dissimilar the norms, 
values, customs and business practices are (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Hofstede, 2001), 
the lower the performance of culturally distant subsidiaries will be (Barkema et al., 
1996).  Perhaps  surprisingly,  our  findings  highlight  the  fact  that  west  European 
managers evaluate the performance of subsidiaries in countries with more dissimilar 
routines,  repertoires  and  working  styles  more  favorable  than  the  performance  in 
countries  that  are  culturally  closer  to  their  home  nations.  Our  interpretation  is  that 
managers of west European MNEs are initially uncertain of their success in a culturally 
different environment or skeptical of the performance of their culturally distant CEE 
subsidiaries, and therefore adjust their aspirations to a lower level. As a consequence, a 
low  aspiration  level  could  eventually  result  in  a  satisfactory  evaluation  of  the 
subsidiary’s performance. Furthermore, valuable knowledge about culturally imbedded 
practices is acquired through an investment in a culturally distant CEE country. If that 
knowledge  is  of  critical  importance  for  the  MNE’s  development  of  organizational 
practices, the strategic importance of the subsidiary will favorably influence a positive 
evaluation of its performance.  
The present study identifies to what extent vital capabilities of MNEs determine 
their  managers’  satisfaction  with  subsidiaries’  performance  in  CEE  transition 
economies.  Advertising  intensity  positively  affects  satisfaction  with  distribution, 
marketing,  firm  reputation  and  market  access  at  the  subsidiary  level,  whilst 
technological intensity has the opposite effect. Meyer (2001) points out that in Eastern 
Europe  technology  transfer  is  of  secondary  importance  to  the  transfer  of  modern 
managerial skills. Marketing expertise is an asset of great importance in CEE, however, 
because in the central planning system enterprises produced under instruction and not 
for the market, thus implying that modern marketing knowledge was once rendered 
redundant. Importing marketing skills from developed-economy firms, on the one hand, 
creates a competitive advantage over local products and brands and, on the other hand,   28 
marketing  and  advertisement  leaders  can  gain  market  power  by  defeating  global 
competitors in foreign markets by aggressively creating brand-name loyalty.  
Reversely,  technology  transfer  in  CEE  is  difficult  and  conditional  on  the 
establishment  mode  (a  greenfield  or  an  acquisition).  In  the  case  of  a  greenfield, 
technologically  intensive  MNEs  not  only  need  to  transfer  modern  technology  and 
equipment, but also must engage in extensive re-training of local labor to overcome the 
deficiencies of divergent educational systems. The process of re-training is very time 
consuming,  and  may  involve  unforeseen  expenditures  and  delays.  Therefore,  the 
positive outcome of MNEs’ technological “superiority” will most likely be obstructed. 
In the case of an acquisition, western MNEs acquire local enterprises with weak and 
outdated  technological  capabilities.  To  make  production  facilities  competitive,  the 
MNE generally needs to make significant post-acquisition investments to restructure 
the  local  enterprise,  change  its  corporate  strategy  and  structure,  and  engage  in 
technological modernization (Newman, 2000; Meyer, 2001). However, strong inertial 
forces within an organization might prevent even technologically rational adaptations, 
which  put  further  burden  on  the  post-acquisition  integration  process  (Barkema  and 
Vermeulen,  1998).  In  conclusion,  regardless  of  the establishment  mode,  technology 
transfer is difficult and time consuming in CEE countries. Therefore, the positive effect 
predicted by theory in transition economies is unlikely to be reflected in short-term 
evaluations of subsidiary performance.
8    
In the early 1990s, the CEE countries not only experienced major political and 
economic changes, but also an annual decline in GDP by approximately 20 per cent. 
During these first years of expansion into CEE, the GDP decline may have curtailed 
initially foreseen benefits from entering into these new markets. Consequently, market-
seeking FDI has produced rather disappointing results (Uhlenbruck, 1997). Our survey 
conducted in 2003 reveals opposite results: investments aiming at establishing a market 
presence resulted in high satisfaction with the subsidiaries’ performance. At least two 
incremental changes in the region may have triggered a more optimistic perspective on 
performance. First, after 1995, there was generally a more positive outlook on CEE 
economies (Transition Report, 1996). Second, in the period 1995-2003, most of the 
countries  in  the  region  initiated  negotiations  for  EU  membership,  demonstrated   29 
considerable progress in their transition, and reached a consensus on a future date for 
accession (i.e., May 2004). The prospects of an enlarged EU common market presented 
a lucrative opportunity of serving an additional 150 million consumers, yet imposed a 
threat of labor cost equalization in a foreseeable future. Clearly, in a greater EU of 25 
member states, a long-term factor-seeking strategy cannot be ultimately viable, while an 
establishment of a stable market presence in CEE is mostly promising. Furthermore, a 
stable  market presence  goes  hand  in  hand  with  a  multidomestic  strategic  approach, 
rather than adopting a global strategy in a new environment. A recent survey of the 
Hungarian retail market points to the key success factor for one of the best-performing 
western  retailers  (UK-based  Tesco):  a  meticulous  attention  to  local  market 
characteristics,  namely  ultra-high  price  sensitivity,  local  sourcing  of  most  retailed 
products, and a wide selection of local favorites (Budapest Week Online, 2005).  
This  study  has  several  limitations, all pointing  to interesting avenues for future 
research. First, the insufficient number of respondents by industry prevents us from 
investigating  in-depth  the  industry-level  factors  that  might  influence  managers’ 
satisfaction  with  their  subsidiary’s  performance.  Future  studies  may  overcome  this 
drawback  by  focusing  on  a  limited  number  of  industries,  investigating  detailed 
industry-specific  factors  that  may  determine  a  particular  foreign  investment  mode 
preference. Second, the time window of the collected data implies a methodological 
weakness. The survey inquired about the latest CEE entry, yet in many cases the time 
gap  was  over five  years,  which increases  the chances of recall  and memory  biases 
typical of retrospective surveys. A better response accuracy will be achieved if future 
studies avoid surveying firms that have not made relevant investments within a shorter 
time period. Third, our study is limited to foreign entry decisions by west European 
MNEs into a pre-selected set of CEE countries. Further work is needed to find out to 
which  extent  our  findings  are  generalizable  to  other  transition  or  non-transition 
countries, and to MNEs from other parts of the world. 
Clearly, a multi-theory perspective that takes into consideration both the MNEs’ 
asset specificities and the host-countries’ environmental idiosyncrasies offers a better 
platform for determining the drivers of performance than single-theory lenses. Indeed, 
our set of five theories produced hypotheses that proved to make sense in the context of   30 
explaining  managerial  satisfaction  with  the  performance  of  subsidiaries  of  west 
European  MNEs  in  CEE  countries.  Nevertheless,  one  critical  question  remains 
unanswered:  What  is  the  relative  importance  of  all  tested  predictors  on  managerial 
satisfaction with performance, and in what situation will institutional inefficiency be a 
more important determinant of subsidiaries’ performance than the MNEs’ capabilities? 
Furthermore,  which  of  the  institutional  forces  have  a  greater  impact  on  MNEs’ 
activities in transition economies: differences in legal systems, government corruption 
or political instability? Can we assume that, because of the decade-long EU integration 
programs in CEE, there are hardly any institutional differences between the old and 
new  EU  members,  and  that  such  differences  are  in  fact  only  a  false  managerial 
perception?  Future  research  could  achieve  in-depth  understanding  of  firms’ 
performance by initiating detailed surveys on a larger number of MNEs.        
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Table 1. Factor analysis of performance measures 
 
Rotated factor matrix 
Factors and items 
 
1 
 
2 
Satisfaction with Financial Performance measures (α = .87)      
          Satisfaction with sales level  0.88  - 
          Satisfaction with sales growth  0.87  - 
          Satisfaction with profitability  0.82  - 
Satisfaction with Marketing Performance measures   (α = .89)     
          Satisfaction with reputation  0.34  0.82 
          Satisfaction with market access  -  0.77 
          Satisfaction with distribution  -  0.87 
          Satisfaction with marketing  -  0.86 
Eigenvalues  1.19  4.87 
Cumulative per centage variance explained  77.90  42.14 
 
 
   42 
Table 2: Cluster analysis of strategy variables 
 
 
 
Items (Scale:  Strongly disagree   1    2    3    4    5    Strongly agree) 
                                          
(a)  Our  company’s  worldwide  strategy  was  focused  on  achieving  economies  of  scale  by 
concentrating its important activities at a limited number of locations. 
 
(b)  Our company’s competitive position was defined in worldwide terms. Different national product 
markets were closely linked and interconnected. Competition took place on a global basis. 
 
(c)  Our  company’s  worldwide  competitive  strategy  was  to  let  each  subsidiary  compete  on  a 
domestic level as national product markets were judged too different to make competition on a 
global level possible. 
 
(d)   Our company not only recognized national differences in taste and values, but also actually tried 
to respond to these national differences by consciously adapting products and policies to the local 
market.
Cluster names  Economies  of 
scale 
Global 
competition 
Domestic 
competition 
Differentiation 
(product 
adaptation) 
Global  3.08  3.78  2.01  2.67 
Multidomestic  2.63  2.05  4.12  3.92 
t-value  2.497 (0.013)  10.525 (0.000)  -16.231 (0.000)  -7.809 (0.000)   43 
Table 3: Means, standard deviations and correlations among all variables 
 
     VARIABLES
 n  MEAN S.D.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19 
1. Marketing Performance  22.46  9.56                                       
2. Financial Performance  16.23  7.19  .557**                                     
3. Institutional Instability  22.30  4.56  -.073  -.061                                   
4. Institutional Corruptness  4.07  1.25  .101  .065  .126                                 
5. Cultural Distance  1.85  1.70  .181*  .155*  .246**  .449**                               
6. Technological Intensity  2.07  1.07  -.180** -.039  -.036  -.061  -.009                             
7. Advertising Intensity  2.06  1.13  .157*  .057  .019  .063  -.053  .146*                           
8. Market Focus  .83  .38  .279**  -.067  -.001  .093  .073  -.137*  .142*                         
9. International Strategy   .58  .49  .249**  .040  -.024  .025  .019  -.110  .094  .227**                       
10. Ownership Stake  .87  .22  .065  .102  .126  -.071  -.058  .095  -.058  -.073  -.087                     
11. Establishment Mode  .36  .48  .002  -.020  -.217** -.027  -.037  -.032  -.068  -.052  -.114  -.226**                  
12. Acquisition Experience  10.90  35.11 .126  .092  .109  .063  .162*  -.039  -.047  -.073  -.117  .016  .214*                 
13. Greenfield Experience  15.59  34.90 .043  .012  .072  -.029  .027  .003  .016  -.012  -.064  .108  -.079  .396**               
14. Industry Growth  3.20  1.06  .150*  .196**  -.013  -.040  -.033  .102  .082  .142*  .007  -.046  -.074  -.034  .017             
15. Regional Experience  11.66  14.80 .066  .140*  -.094  .072  .067  .065  -.038  .060  -.002  .046  -.009  .016  .335**  .105           
16. Firm Size  86.56  24.72 .069  -.043  .022  .106  .097  .012  .103  .040  -.020  .034  .213**  .367**  .188**  -.043  -.034         
17. Subsidiary Age  4.93  3.37  -.076  -.009  .144*  .005  -.142*  -.062  -.024  -.075  -.041  .038  .019  .069  .039  -.226** -.017  -.070       
18. High-Tech Industry   .20  .40  -.112  .029  -.050  -.015  -.155*  .290**  .015  -.092  -.108  .120  .068  .132  .214**  -.059  .141*  .091  .149*     
19. Low-Tech Industry   .36  .48  .021  .038  .003  -.084  .121  -.042  .046  .006  -.045  -.015  .021  -.013  -.208** .046  -.120  -.103  -.120  -.383**  
20. Non-OECD Industry  .43  .49  .070  -.060  .039  .094  .010  -.194** -.057  .068  .131  -.082  -.075  -.094  .029  .003  .003  .027  .003  -.436** -.664**   45 
Table 4: Multiple regression analysis  
Constant  19.601 (6.66)***    15.530** (2.82)   16.043*** (6.66)   17.069** (3.02) 
Establishment Mode  -0.252 (-0.15)           1.188     (0.71)   -0.252      (-0.15)      0.165     (0.10) 
Acquisition Experience   4.425
†   (1.97)         4.298*    (2.04)    4.425
†    (1.97)         2.780     (1.27) 
Greenfield Experience  -1.345   (-0.58)        -1.447    (-0.68)   -1.345    (-0.58)      -3.667
†   (-1.68) 
Industry Growth   1.181
†   (1.67)         1.669*    (2.48)    1.181
†   (1.67)         2.126** (3.17) 
Regional Experience   5.163    (1.12)         3.044      (0.70)    5.163    (1.12)         9.987*
    (2.36) 
Firm Size   1.220    (0.16)         8.630      (0.12)    1.220    (0.16)         5.832     (0.80) 
Subsidiary Age   -0.131   (-0.59)        3.161      (0.02)   -0.131   (-0.59)        0.107      (0.51) 
High-Technology Industries  -3.163   (-1.57)        -0.314    (-0.15)   -3.163   (-1.57)        1.947      (0.95) 
Low-Technology Industries  -1.385   (0.85)         -1.513    (-0.92)   -1.385   (-0.85)       -0.165     (0.10) 
Ownership Stake (H1)                                   9.609** (2.99)                                    5.191     (1.56) 
Institutional Instability (H2a)                                  -0.321*  (-2.02)                                   -0.140 
    (-0.87)  
Institutional Corruption (H2b)                                  -0.646    (-1.00)                                   -1.426*
   (-2.12) 
Cultural Distance (H3)                                   1.217*    (2.60)                                    1.431**  (2.96) 
Technological Intensity (H4a)                                  -2.072**(-2.99)                                    -1.311
†   (-1.87) 
Advertising Intensity (H4b)                                   1.515*    (2.39)                                     1.066
†    (1.68) 
International Strategy (H5a)                                   3.971**  (3.04)                                  2.035     (1.37)  
Market Focus (H5b)                                   4.873*    (2.45)                                 -1.505    (-0.73) 
N   171                          162    171                        163 
F  1.471                        4.079***   1.649                      2.234** 
Adjusted R
2  0.08                          0.34    0.09                       0.21 
 
Two-tailed tests: † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001  (standardized beta coefficients and t-statistics 
presented).  
 
Independent variables  Marketing Performance           
Model 1                 Model2 
Financial Performance             
Model 3                 Model 4 
    Betas     t-stat        Betas     t-stat   Betas     t-stat         Betas     t-stat     47 
Figure 1: A multi-theory perspective 
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NOTES 
                                                
1 We refrain from reviewing the literature on the evolutionary role of subsidiaries in MNEs (see 
Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998) and draw upon traditional academic models that view subsidiaries as either 
market access providers or recipients of the parents’ technology transfer (Vernon, 1986). 71 per cent of 
our observations refer to investments made after 1995, thus considering the model of subsidiary 
evolution by Birkinshaw and Hood (1998), we believe the CEE subsidiaries in this study are in a rather 
early stage of evolution and therefore dependent on parents’ decisions regarding allocation of activities. 
Hence, our focus is on parents’ subjective evaluation exclusively.   
2 Scott (1995) conceptualizes institutional forces into three groups: regulative, normative and cognitive. 
We concentrate primarily on the effect of regulative institutions because regulative forces are the most 
commonly studied in international business (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Brouthers, 2002). In addition, 
we study cultural distance to capture the second institutional pillar, namely countries’ normative forces 
(values and norms). 
3 Hoskisson et al. (2000) identified 64 emerging economies, among which 51 are rapidly growing 
developing countries and 13 are in transition from centrally planned economies (they are mostly referred 
to as transition economies). 
4 Brouthers (2002) studies the performance of subsidiaries of EU firms in an unspecified range of 
transition economies. 
5 Psychic distance can be defined as the distance between the home market and a foreign market, 
resulting from the perception of both cultural and business differences (Evans and Mavondo, 2002). 
6 Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1989) typology describes four strategic types of multinational companies: 
global, multidomestic, international and transnational. We only examine the influence of global strategy 
and multidomestic strategy due to a lack of empirical support for the existence of international strategy 
(Harzing, 2000) and the ambiguity about the empirical support for the transnational solution. 
7 We comply with the majority of empirical studies that use a stake of 10 per cent and above in a foreign 
enterprise as a minimum to qualify as a foreign direct investment (Benito and Gripsurd, 1992; 
Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999; Larimo, 2002). 
8 Note that only 67 (32%) of the investments in our sample were made before 1998. Therefore, we 
regard the majority of the evaluations as short-term ones. 